When the BCGEU job action forced closures of the Superintendent of Motor Vehicles this week, it announced that all Immediate Roadside Prohibition (IRP) and Administrative Driving Prohibition (ADP) hearings were adjourned to an unspecified future date. Hearings that had been booked were simply cancelled without any new dates.

Licences, however, remained suspended. Vehicles stayed in impound.

For thousands of British Columbians, this was more than an inconvenience. It was a denial of constitutional and statutory rights.

Procedural Fairness and Constitutional Rights

Drivers facing an IRP or ADP are entitled under the Motor Vehicle Act to a timely hearing before an adjudicator. They have only seven days to apply, and the Superintendent has strict deadlines to hold the hearing and render a decision. These timelines are not suggestions. They exist to protect the driver’s Charter-protected right to a reasonable opportunity to challenge the apparent result of the prohibition.

They are also an important part of procedural fairness. The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently recognized that when a person’s livelihood, mobility, and reputation are at stake, the state must provide a fair and timely process. The court has recognized that a component of procedural fairness includes considering a person’s circumstances before taking action that could negatively impact them.

By unilaterally adjourning hearings without new dates, the Superintendent effectively suspended those rights. Drivers re left in legal limbo, unable to contest prohibitions or retrieve their vehicles. This is not simply administrative delay—it is the government denying citizens access to the very process the law guarantees.

Lack of Due Process and Denial of Representation

It is also an important component of procedural fairness that a person have the right to be heard. The superintendent cannot act unilaterally to adjourn an individual’s hearing to an unknown date or to a date certain without corresponding with that individual and allowing them the opportunity to be heard on the adjournment.

Drivers had the right to oppose these adjournments, but they were given no opportunity to do so. The superintendent Motor Vehicles Office refused to accept any submissions.

In addition, drivers have the right to be represented by council at the hearing, and now that specific dates have been scheduled for hearings, no dates have been scheduled with consultation in consideration of council’s calendar. In fact, in our office, a number of hearings have been double-booked!

No Authority to Adjourn Without a Date

When the cancellations of hearings first happened, the Superintendent of Motor Vehicles adjourned hearings to an unspecified date. Drivers were left without knowing when, if ever, their hearings would be scheduled again. It is only now that drivers are learning their hearings are being rescheduled nearly three weeks down the road.

During this time, nobody has received an interim license, and no vehicles are being released from impound. For most individuals affected by this, they will have served a third of the existing driving prohibition, and the vehicle will have served the entirety of the impoundment.

The Motor Vehicle Act does not give the Superintendent the power to adjourn a hearing to no fixed date. The statute requires that a hearing be scheduled and completed within specific timelines. Extensions are contemplated, but only after a hearing has been conducted and only for the limited purpose of allowing the adjudicator more time to deliver a decision.

There is no statutory authority to indefinitely postpone the hearing itself.

By cancelling hearings without setting new dates, the Superintendent acted outside the scope of the Act.

We brought this issue to the attention of the Superintendent of Motor Vehicles as soon as these indefinite adjournments of hearings were sent to our office. We argued that the Superintendent had lost jurisdiction over the matters, and the prohibitions had to be revoked.

Loss of Jurisdiction

Administrative tribunals are creatures of statute. They have only the powers granted by their enabling legislation. When the Superintendent adjourned hearings with no date and no statutory authority, the office arguably lost jurisdiction over those cases.

Once the prescribed time to hold the hearing and render a decision has expired, the right to issue a prohibition or uphold a suspension may have lapsed. Drivers who challenge the delays in court may have an argument that the Superintendent’s actions were ultra vires—beyond legal power—and that the prohibitions should be set aside.

We are currently advancing a court challenge to that effect.

Failure to Provide Temporary Relief

Compounding the unfairness, the Superintendent refused to reinstate licences or release impounded vehicles while hearings were on hold.

Drivers were punished for the government’s labour dispute. They lost jobs, missed medical appointments, and will be responsible for thousands of dollars in storage and rental costs—all without any opportunity to have their case heard. Let’s not forget that all the while these impound fees are racking up tax dollars and revenue for the government in addition to revenue for towing and storage yards.

At a minimum, fairness requires that licences be temporarily reinstated and vehicles released until a hearing could be held. Nothing in the Motor Vehicle Act prevents such interim relief, and basic constitutional principles demand it.

The Path Forward

The strike exposed a critical weakness in British Columbia’s administrative justice system. When a government agency can shut its doors, cancel hearings, and continue to punish citizens without legal authority, the rule of law is at risk. Courts should scrutinize these actions closely.

Drivers should challenge prohibitions issued during this period on the grounds that the Superintendent acted without jurisdiction and denied procedural fairness. Legislators should amend the Motor Vehicle Act to ensure that, in the event of future labour disputes, citizens are not left stranded without remedy.

The government cannot impose strict deadlines on the public while exempting itself. The BCGEU strike may have disrupted operations, but it did not suspend the Charter. The Superintendent of Motor Vehicles cannot invent powers the legislature never granted.

There is a delicate balance between the constitutionally-protected right to freedom of expression and freedom of association, which protect the right to strike, and the Charter-protected right of individuals subject to these driving prohibitions to a fair and timely review.

But the weighing of that balance should not result in injustice being done to these drivers.